RESOURCES
Texas Cases
I. CONFLICTS OF INTERESTII. JUDICIAL ERROR
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IV. MALPRACTICE, MISCONDUCT, AND NEGLIGENCE
V. ATTORNEY’S FEES
I. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
May v. Crofts, 868 S.W.2d 397 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1993).
Client did not show "that she would be prejudiced by attorney’s serving in dual roles of witness and counsel," and attorney was therefore not disqualified.
Mauze v. Curry, 861 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. 1993).
"Attorney representing plaintiffs should have been disqualified after 'testifying' as expert witness."
Marquez v. State Farm Lloyd's of Dallas, 838 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1992).
Former district attorney was not disqualified from representing clients who could be charged with arson in connection with transaction in question.
Polland & Cook v. Lehmann, 832 S.W.2d 729 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992).
Referral fee case in which "attorney was sued in correct capacity as individual." Referring attorney did not have conflict of interest.
Westheimer v. Tennant, 831 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992).
Attorney-client privilege did not bar deposition of attorney.
Haley v. Boles, 824 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1992).
Attorney disqualified because his partner was the spouse of prosecutor assigned to the case.
Clarke v. Ruffino, 819 S.W.2d 947 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991).
Attorney-client relationship existed; confidential information precluded firm from representing client.
Smith, Wright & Weed, P.C. v. Stone, 818 S.W.2d 926 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991).
"Fact that deposition was sought of attorney representing one of the parties did not prevent the taking of the deposition."
Sipes v. Petry and Stewart, 812 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1991).
Client failed to prove beyond doubt that attorney’s alleged conflict of interest was producing cause of injury to client, and summary judgment was thus granted to attorney.
Central Texas Hardware v. First City, 810 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991).
Bank's lawyers were not disqualified on grounds of conflict of interest.
Simons v. State, 805 S.W.2d 519 (Tex.App.--Waco, 1991).
Existence of "program which provided money for defense of indigent prisoners being prosecuted for offenses committed while in prison" did not violate conflict of interest regulations.
Ussery v. Gray, 804 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1991).
"Attorney General's Office ... was not ... disqualified even though it represented father in a separate suit filed against him."
Howard v. Texas Dept. of Human Services, 791 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1990).
"Attorney’s prior representation of mother in proceeding to modify conservatorship of her two children conflicted with representation of children."
Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1989).
Trial court erroneously failed to disqualify attorney when he "testified as a material witness."
Ayres v. Canales, 790 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1990).
Trial court in error for preventing relator attorneys from participating in suit on their behalf.
Petroleum Wholesale, Inc. v. Marshall, 781 S.W.2d 295 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1988).
Law firm disqualified when one of its new members was proven privy to information gleaned from another firm.
Enstar Petroleum Co. v. Mancias, 773 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1989).
"Attorney whose former law firm represented his client's opponent was vicariously disqualified," but, since they had no knowledge of the suit, new partners of firm were not.
Randell v. State, 770 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1989).
"Calling district attorney to testify for limited purpose of proving prior conviction did not present grounds for disqualification."
NCNB Texas Nat. Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. 1989).
Reversal of a lower court's decision to disqualify attorney because he had represented the same client in an earlier matter.
Arkla Energy Resources v. Jones, 762 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1988).
Court held that law firm was not barred from representing a client merely because it had represented that client in other similar, but not directly related, matters.
Callaway v. Barber, 760 S.W.2d 698 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1988).
Judge found in error for not allowing an attorney to cease representation of one of his clients while continuing to represent others in the same matter.
Sutherland v. Caballero, 750 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1988).
Attorney exonorated on charges of malpractice due to alleged conflict of interest.
Almanzar v. State, 702 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986).
No conflict of interest--and therefore no ineffective assistance of counsel--found in this case.
Gleason v. Coman, 693 S.W.2d 564 (Tex.App. 14 Dist. 1985).
Since case involved personal information, attorney was at fault for representing ex-wife of former client. Former client, however, was not legally able to enjoin attorney from representing ex-wife.
Baptist Memorial Hosp. System v. Bashara, 685 S.W.2d 352 (Tex.App. 4 Dist. 1984).
"Conflict of interest between injured party and hospital precluded attorney from charging both parties."
Dillard v. Berryman, 683 S.W.2d 13 (Tex.App. 2 Dist. 1984).
Firm disqualified when one of its attorneys was shown to have reviewed a current case while working, some time before, in the office of the district attorney.
Amaya v. State, 677 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.App. 1 Dist. 1984).
Court ruled that representation of three brothers by one attorney constituted conflict of interest.
Stocking v. Biery, 677 S.W.2d 792 (Tex.App. 4 Dist. 1984).
"Mere announcment by movant that he intends to call opposing counsel as a witness is insufficient to demand disqualification of the attorney."
Wolf v. State, 674 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.App. 13 Dist. 1984).
Defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel claim by failing to show actual conflict of interest.
Ex Parte Acosta, 672 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.Cr.App 1984).
Client received habeas corpus relief because of conflict of interest during a probation revocation proceeding.
II. JUDICIAL ERROR
Thomas v. Ray, 889 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. 1994).
"Supreme Court ... held that exclusion of experts for failure to timely designate was abuse of discretion."
R.R.E. v. Glenn, 884 S.W.2d 189 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1994).
"Presence of disqualified juror who had previously been convicted of felony ... deprived law firm of its constitutional right to jury of 12 members."
Charles v. Tamez, 878 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1994).
"Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying turnover of ... legal malpractice action."
Lewis v. Wittig, 877 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994).
"Trial court abused its discretion in granting protective order based on trial court's erroneous belief that lawyers' discovery request for clients' entire files was not subject to waiver through offensive use."
State Bar of Texas v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1994).
Neither "allowance of trial amendment alleging barratry" nor "disbarment of attorney for soliciting employment" constitute abuses of discretion.
Kilpatrick v. State Bar of Texas, 869 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993).
Trial amendment charging "barratry" was improper; "sanction of disbarment was so heavy as to constitute abuse of discretion."
Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Tyson, 862 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1993).
"Corporate defendant would not be exempt from death penalty sanctions based on attorney’s conduct." "Death penalty sanctions were abuse of discretion."
Sampson v. State, 854 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992).
Hearing ordered to decide whether or not to grant motion to substitute counsel.
Adamo v. State Farm Lloyds Co., 853 S.W.2d 673 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993).
"Trial court's denial of insureds' request for oral hearing on summary judgment motion was not reversible error."
In re Jimenez, 841 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.Spec.Ct.Rev. 1992).
Letter written by judge to police chief did not violate rules of ethics.
Joachim v. Chambers, 815 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1991).
Code of Judicial Conduct precluded judge from testifying as expert witness.
Roberts v. Burkett, 802 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1990).
"Statement made by counsel for attorneys that attorneys did not think that one client was negligent was not a judicial admission."
State Ex Rel. Eidson v. Edwards, 793 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Cr.App. 1990).
"Trial court was without authority or jurisdiction to disqualify district attorney and his entire staff from prosecuting case."
Wright v. Lewis, 777 S.W.2d 520 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1989).
"Letter written by assistant U.S. attorney to employee of state licensing body was not admissible under hearsay exceptions for public records or for official reports."
J.K. and Susie L. Wadley Research v. Morris, 776 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989).
Mandamus can direct trial court to disqualify attorneys.
Hardy v. McCorkle, 765 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1989).
A partial delineation of jurisdictional limitations applicable to judges.
Feist v. Sekaly, 739 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.App--Beaumont 1987).
"Failure of trial judge to order hearing on motion to disqualify, before entering summary judgment, violated rule governing disqualification of judges."
Gilbert McClure Enterprises v. Burnett, 735 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987).
Attorney wrongly disqualified for not being disclosed as a witness during discovery even though he had personal knowledge of relevant facts.
State Ex Rel. Millsap v. Lozano, 692 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985).
Court supported writ of mandamus compelling "judge to vacate order recusing another judge from trial of criminal case after completion of guilt and penalty stages of trial."
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Ponder v. Brice & Mankoff, 889 S.W.2d 637 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994).
Legal malpractice action held to be time barred.
Norwood v. Piro, 887 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1994).
In malpractice suit, "issues of fact precluded summary judgment on basis of statute of limitations."
King v. Holland, 884 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1994).
"Issue of material fact as to whether clients knew or should have known about defects in attorney’s performance precluded summary judgment for attorney based on statute of limitations."
Phillips v. Allums, 882 S.W.2d 71 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994).
"Attorney was not collaterally estopped from re-litigating question of wrongful nature of deed ... by summary judgment previously entered in litigation."
Rea v. Cofer, 879 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994).
Attorney accused of malpractice protected by statute of limitations.
Besing v. Vanden Eykel, 878 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1994).
For legal malpractice cases, decision extending limitations period "did not change ... earlier ... decision that statute of limitations had run on former client's malpractice claim."
Sample v. Freeman, 873 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1994).
"Legal malpractice action was actionable under DTPA," "action was not barred by statute of limitations," and attorney was found negligent.
Blake v. Lewis, 866 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993).
"When motion for summary judgment is served by mail, three days must be added to the postmark to determine the 21-day period to which the respondent is entitled before hearing."
Jampole v. Matthews, 857 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993).
Statute of limitations varies depending on claim. "Summary judgment based on failure of plaintiffs' amended pleadings to conform to order granting special exceptions was improper."
Owen v. Knop, 853 S.W.2d 638 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1993).
"Client was judicially estopped from asserting attorney’s failure to timely file suit."
McVeigh v. Lerner, 849 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993).
Suit to enjoin unfulfilled legal malpractice judgment "had to be brought in court in which judgment was originally rendered."
Mathew v. McCoy, 847 S.W.2d 397 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993).
Client's claims were time-barred; "dismissal of legal malpractice claims of clients' child ... was not abuse of discretion."
Washington v. Georges, 837 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1992).
Court "held that statute of limitations was tolled until final judgment was issued in lawsuit giving rise to malpractice claim."
Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 822 S.W.2d 63 (Tex.App.--Waco 1990).
Dispute about when statute of limitations began resolved in favor of attorney.
Gordon v. Ward, 822 S.W.2d 90 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991).
Attorney failed to establish that malpractice suit was barred by statute of limitations; attorney’s failure to file appeal bond could not be proximate cause for her injuries.
Lerma v. Pecorino, 822 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992).
"Inmate's imprisonment was not legal disability tolling statute of limitations" in malpractice case.
Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991).
"When an attorney commits malpractice in the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of limitations on the malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claim are exhausted."
Aduddell v. Parkhill, 821 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. 1991).
"Statute of limitations on medical malpractice claim ... was tolled until all appeals of underlying claim were exhausted."
Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Brown, 821 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1991).
In real estate case, "limitations period on malpractice claim was tolled until wrongful disclosure action was finally resolved."
Clark v. Pruett, 820 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist] 1991).
"Client provided sufficient evidence to raise estoppel to defendant's statute of limitations defense."
American Medical Electronics v. Korn, 819 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1991).
Client should have filed malpractice suit upon receipt of written proof of injury.
Rose v. Baker & Botts, 816 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991).
"Claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty were timed barred, and ... issue of material fact existed with respect to claim that attorneys had overcharged for travel expenses."
Gumm v. Owen, 815 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1991).
Court ruled that client should have filed malpractice action against attorney four years before he did.
Medical Protective Co. v. Groce, et al., 814 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1991).
Material issue of fact as to when clients discovered that firm caused their injuries precluded "summary judgment in favor of law firm on grounds that limitations barred client's actions."
Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Brown, 813 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991).
Client's action barred by statue of limitations; summary judgment should not have been granted on second cause of action.
Smith v. McKinney, 792 S.W.2d 740 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990).
"Client waved discovery rule ... and limitations plea of attorney and firm prevailed as matter of law."
Burns v. Thomas, 790 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1988).
"Statute of limitations period for legal malpractice ... began to run against former partner on date cause of action accrued."
Burns v. Thomas, 786 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1990).
Summary judgment on limitations grounds precluded by "fact issue as to when client discovered ... that attorney failed to appeal judgment against him."
Hamilton v. Amaimo, 775 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1989).
"Order granting attorney’s motion for summary judgment on limitations grounds was interlocutory and not subject to appeal."
Morrison v. Brewster and Mayhall, 773 S.W.2d 607 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1989).
Statute of limitations for negligence did not begin to run until improperly-prepared will was denied probate.
Pham v. Nguyen, 763 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1988).
Decision to grant attorney a judgment non obstante veredicto overturned because of four year statute of limitations.
Sledge v. Alsup, 759 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1988).
Personal Injury statute of limitations prevents malpractice action.
Sutherland v. Caballero, 759 S.W.2d 945 (Texas 1988).
Client waited too long to bring malpractice allegation.
Black v. Wills, 758 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1988).
Attorney uses statute of limitations to avoid malpractice suit.
Indep. Life and Acc. Ins. v. Childs, et al., 756 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1988).
Court ruled that statute of limitations does not bar malpractice action.
Hartsough v. Steinberg, 737 S.W.2d 408 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987).
Malpractice action barred by statute of limitations.
Willis v. Maverick, 723 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1986).
After a dispute about date of alleged malpractice, court ruled that statute of limitations obviated filing of a successful suit.
Crean v. Chozick, 714 S.W.2d 61 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1986).
"Clients' allegations that their former attorney failed to disclose legal effect of signing requests for admissions raised genuine issue of material fact as to whether concealment had occurred, thus tolling the two-year limitations period."
Zidell v. Bird, 692 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.App. 3 Dist. 1985).
Attorney’s reprehensibility for multiple counts of negligence barred by statute of limitations.
Liles v. Phillips, 677 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.App. 2 Dist. 1984).
Attorney exonerated from malpractice charge on basis of statute of limitations.
IV. MALPRACTICE, MISCONDUCT, AND NEGLIGENCE
Haynes & Boone v. Bowser Bouldin, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1995).
"No evidence existed to establish causal nexus between actions of law firm and loss of sales contract."
City of Garland v. Booth, 895 S.W.2d 766 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1995).
"Legal malpractice claims are not assignable;" "no evidence established that counsel shared confidences with city's opponents;" "success in obtaining disqualification could not serve as basis for presumption that confidences were shared."
Valdez v. Aldrich, 892 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994).
Client's pro se appeal of attorney’s summary judgment in legal malpractice action was insufficient.
Ross v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 892 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994).
"Attorneyss failed to satisfy 'special injury' element of their malicious prosecution claim."
Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1994).
"Guardian could not be held liable for attorney malpractice even though he was an attorney."
Blake v. Lewis, 886 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994).
Court held that "firm's withdrawal from client's case was not malpractice" and "denial of continuance was not an abuse of discretion."
Detenbeck v. Koester, 886 S.W.2d 477 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994).
Process action filed against attorney failed to state cause of action and was therefore unsuccessful.
Matter of Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. 1994).
Conviction of tax evasion compelled attorney’s disbarment.
Saks v. Sawtelle, Goode, 880 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1994).
Public policy barred clients' legal malpractice action.
Sanchez v. Hastings, 880 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1994).
Client discovered or should have discovered "facts establishing legal malpractice ... at time of settlement hearing."
Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1994).
Court "held that assignment of legal malpractice action arising from litigation was invalid."
Peterson v. White, 877 S.W.2d 62 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1994).
Court "held that defendant presented no evidence of proximate cause or damages" in gross negligence and intentional wrongful acts of malpractice action.
Yaklin v. Glusing, Sharpe & Krueger, 875 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1994).
"Genuine issue of material fact, as to whether attorney-client relationshiop existed between client and counsel, precluded summary judgment for counsel."
White v. Walker, 872 S.W.2d 346 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1994).
Actions and advice of attorney were not proximate cause for client’s conviction.
Board of Law Examiners v. Stevens, 868 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1994).
Attorney’s "denial of application for admission to Bar, due to lack of 'good moral character,' was supported by evidence."
MND Drilling Corp. v. Lloyd, 866 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1987).
Attorney was not liable in malpractice suit since his actions did not affect suit’s resolution.
Dover v. Baker, Brown, Sharman & Parker, 859 S.W.2d 441 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993).
"Plaintiff was collaterally estopped from asserting that he relied on advice of defendants by prior criminal convictions in which such reliance would have been defense."
State Bar of Texas v. Lerner, 859 S.W.2d 496 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993).
"Attorney’s conduct with respect to settlement of lawsuit did not involve dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or conduct that adversely reflected upon her fitness to practice law."
Scrivner v. Hobson, 854 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993).
Clients successfully brought suit "alleging that attorney settled lawsuit without their authority, incorrectly calculated value of their share of settlement proceeds, and impermissibly divided share of settlement."
Board of Law Examiners of State of Texas v. Stevens, 850 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.App.--Austin 1992).
Attorney successfully attacked State Bar of Texas's failure to admit him on the basis of his unsubstantiated lack of "good moral character."
Pankhurst v. Weitinger & Tucker, 850 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1993).
Even tangential interest in suit gave client "standing to bring malpractice against debtor's attorneys."
McVeigh v. Lerner, 849 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993).
Suit to enjoin unfulfilled legal malpractice judgment "had to be brought in court in which judgment was originally rendered."
Thomas v. Pryor, 847 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992).
"Beneficiary named in will is barred by Texas law from bringing attorney malpractice suit against attorney who prepared will, based on lack of privity."
Randle v. State, 847 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993).
"Counsel's performance was prejudicially indifferent."
State v. Frye, 846 S.W.2d 443 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992).
Indictment dismissed for prosecutorial misconduct.
McCubbin v. Tate, 844 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1992).
Attorney accused by client of having inaccurately reduced property settlement agreement to writing in divorce case.
Besing v. Smith, 843 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1992)
"In a suit for legal malpractice arising from the prosecution or defense of a litigated claim, the malpractice claim is 'tolled' until all appeals are exhausted in the underlying lawsuit."
American Centennial Ins. v. Canal Ins., 843 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1992).
Clients win equitable subrogation action against counsel.
Maxey v. Morrison, 843 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1992).
Client is unsuccessful in legal malpractice suit because he failed to show that he would have prevailed on appeal.
Stonewall Surplus Lines v. Drabek, 835 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christs 1992).
In suit alleging negligence in firm's defense of client, court held that firm owed duty to client.
Womack v. State, 834 S.W.2d 545 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992).
Reversable error found not only in "state's misleading of court by telling it that defendant waived attorney-client privilege" but also in state's cross-examination of defendant, which constituted "improper comment on defendant's post-arrest silence."
Glass v. Glass, 826 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1992).
A client should not be sanctioned for her attorney’s misconduct.
Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1991).
"Disclosure of statement to district attorney may have been breach of attorney’s ... fiduciary duty."
State Bar of Texas v. Faubion, 821 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991).
Letterhead falsely advertising an attorney’s board certification constitutes material misrepresentation; detrimental reliance is not required to prove violation of disciplinary rule. Attorney also found guilty of "fee splitting."
Dunn v. State, 819 S.W.2d 510 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991).
Defendent convicted of capital murder did not bring sufficient evidence in malpractice suit against his attorney.
American Centennial Ins. v. Canal Ins., 810 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991).
Attorneys exonerated on charges of negligence.
Anderson v. Snider, 809 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1990).
Client "failed to rebut attorney’s explanation that client agreed to amended order and second decree"--and therefore could not maintain action against attorney for malpractice.
Johnson v. DeLay, 809 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1991).
Although client's DTPA claims against attorney required expert testimony, "claim that attorney misrepresented facts to client could be decided by jury."
Anderson v. Snider, 808 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. 1991).
Attorney should not have been granted summary judgment.
Hirsch v. Texas Lawyer's Ins. Exchange, 808 S.W.2d 561 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1991).
Malpractice claim applied to both attorney and his professional organization.
Bunnell v. Jordan, 807 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991).
Attorney won suit alleging legal malpractice, gross negligence and deceptive trade practices.
Komatsu v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 806 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1991).
Attorney admits to neglegence.
Vander Voort v. State Bar of Texas, 802 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990).
Attorney improperly withdrew from representation of client.
Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1990).
"Possibilty that State might call attorney as witness if another former state official changed his testimony at trial was insufficient for disqualification."
Draper v. Garcia, 793 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990).
Attorney "did not represent insurer or its recording agent, and could therefore not be sued for legal malpractice."
Kotzur v. Kelly, 791 S.W.2d 254 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1990).
"Unauthenticated excerpts from deposition were not competent summary judgment proof .... Material issues of fact precluded entry of summary judgment in attorney’s favor."
Minnick v. State Bar of Texas, 790 S.W.2d 87 (Tex.App.--Austin 1990).
"Attorney could be disbarred for acts of misconduct not committed in course of practicing law; and ... misconduct, including misapplication of trust funds and failure to produce records and to respond to proper discovery requests in ethics investigation warranted disbarment."
Musslewhite v. State Bar of Texas, 786 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990).
Attorney "violated probation condition that he not solicit new clients."
Flores v. State, 784 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1990).
"Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel."
Ibarra v. State, 782 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1989).
Code of Professional Responsibility requires "counsel to inform court of controlling precedent."
Mosaga, S.A. v. Baker & Botts, 780 S.W.2d 3 (Tex.App.--Eastland 1989).
Attorney found to be "negligent in preparing agreement which provided for division of real estate commissions with party which was not real estate agent."
Dyer v. Shafer, Gilliland, Davis, et al., 779 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1989).
"Attorneys did not violate a duty by failing to recognize a violation of doctrine of corporate opportunity."
Ward v. Lubojasky, 777 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1989).
Court awarded "sanctions against appellants for taking frivolous appeal."
Millhouse v. Wiesenthal, 775 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. 1989).
Court "held that determination of causation in appellate legal malpractice case is a question of law."
Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1989).
"No subjective good-faith excuse existed for attorney negligence; client was entitled to recover for negligence."
Bobbitt v. Weeks, 774 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1989).
"There is no subjective good-faith excuse for attorney negligence."
Derrick v. State, 773 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989).
Court "held that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel by tactical decisions, respecting voir dire and introduction of defendant's confession."
Parker v. Carnahan, 772 S.W.2d 151 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1989).
"Material issue of fact existed as to whether attorneys were negligent in failing to advise wife that they were not representing her interests."
Sylvia v. Dallas County Child Welfare, 771 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989).
Client "did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel."
Hoggard v. Snodgrass, 770 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989).
"Mandamus was appropriate, as attorney’s representation of child on claim against his mother resulted in immediate and palpable harm." Attorney’s representation was likely to arouse "public suspicion of legal profession."
Toma v. Ahders, 769 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1989).
Attorneys not held responsible for failing to file claim in timely fashion.
Evans v. State Bar of Texas, 768 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1989).
One attorney found in error for impeaching another’s character "with evidence of prior specific acts of misconduct." (Earlier case concerns an attorney’s inappropriate act of overcharging his client.)
Pennington v. State of Texas, 768 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1988).
Attorney at fault for not notifying client of prosecution's plea bargain offer.
State Bar of Texas v. Sutherland, 766 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1989).
Attorney disbarred because of felony conviction attempts to gain reinstatement.
Gamez v. State Bar of Texas, 765 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1988).
Attorney at fault for misrepresenting information to his client and acting without authorization.
Staples v. McKnight, 763 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1988).
Attorney penalized for withdrawing from representation without sufficient cause.
Tate v. State of Texas, 762 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988).
Attorney held culpable for "cross-examination of codefedant about extraneous offense."
Avila v. Havana Painting Co, Inc., 761 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1988).
Attorney found guilty of breaching his fiduciary duty to client in multiple ways.
Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988).
Attorney found negligent for withholding information from client.
Millhouse v. Wiesenthal, 757 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988).
Alleged negligence of attorney bars appeal.
Ex Parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988).
Client "was denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to give applicant any practical assistance in protecting and preserving his appellate rights."
Cosgrove v. Grimes, 757 S.W.2d 508 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988).
Attorney exonorated on basis of "good-faith" exception to legal malpractice allegation.
Messer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988).
Erroneous statements made to client by counsel did not render client's plea of no contest involuntary, nor did they deny him effective assistance of counsel.
Gallegos v. State of Texas, 756 S.W.2d 45 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1988).
Attorney filed legally inconsistent motions, offered ineffective counsel by failing to inform his client sufficiently of his options.
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ramsey, 740 S.W.2d 3 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1987).
"Mistake and/or fraud between attorney and claimant did not justify setting aside of agreement ... in worker's compensation case."
Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987).
Inmate was unjustified in filing malpractice action.
Heath v. Herron, 732 S.W.2d 748 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1987).
Judgment from partnership suit did not act as collateral or judicial estoppel in malpractice suit, and said suit's settlement "did not bar client from bringing legal malpractice suit under election doctrine; attorney had duty to file verified denial of partnership of failure of consideration."
Dickey v. Jansen, 731 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1987).
Judgment in favor of attorney accused of creating a trust that was invalid under Louisiana law.
First State Bank v. Chappell & Handy, P.C., 729 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1987).
Client's "consistent failure to comply with discovery requests" and court orders in this malpractice suit "justified court's decision to strike client's counterclaim."
Melton v. Ryander, 727 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987).
Prosecution's absense on scheduled day of trial permits dismissal for want of prosecution.
Ex Parte Wilson, 724 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987).
Failure of counsel to inform client of plea bargain offer constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and led to reversal.
City of Asherton v. Trigo, 714 S.W.2d 90 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1986).
Attorney awarded summary judgment on counterclaim filed by city alleging that attorney breached duty by allowing default judgment to be taken against the city.
Quitero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 709 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1985).
"Attorney's violation of disciplinary rules ... made release and settlement agreement void and unenforceable."
Cooper v. Fortney, 703 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.App. 14 Dist 1985).
Attorney at fault for drafting a contract that unfairly restrained free trade and inhibited open competition.
Bray v. Squires, 702 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.App. 1 Dist. 1985).
"Sufficient evidence supported finding that former associates did not breach fiduciary duty to law firm."
Tijerina v. Wennermark, 700 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.App. 4 Dist 1985).
"Plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered any harm or injury arising out of, or resulting from, defendant's representations of him."
Van Dyke V. Boswell, O'Toole, Davis & Pickering, 697 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. 1985).
"Litigation of malpractice counterclaim was not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel."
Henrich v. State, 694 S.W.2d 341 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985).
Court held that "disciplinary rules of the code of professional responsibility were not 'laws' as contemplated by statute proscribing admission in criminal case."
Olivares v. State, 693 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.App. 4 Dist. 1985).
Attorney disbarred for lying to clients and obtaining their signatures through fraudulent conduct.
Pacheco v. State, 692 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985).
Judge Teague dissents to majority's decision not to grant an appeal to a client whose attorney failed entirely to represent him.
State v. Malone, 692 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.App. 9 Dist. 1985).
Court found that an attorney’s "failure to cooperate with Grievance Committee in investigation, neglect of legal matters, failure to seek clients' lawful objectives, and failure to withdraw from employment after discharge warrant[ed] disciplinary action."
Holt v. State, 683 S.W.2d 92 (Tex.App.--Austin 1984).
"Counsel violated attorney disciplinary rule by calling associate in his firm to testify on defendant's behalf."
Hanzelka v. State, 682 S.W.2d 385 (Tex.App. 3 Dist. 1984).
"Attorney’s failure to inform defendant of a plea-bargaining offer denied defendant effective representation of counsel."
Rocha v. Ahmad, 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.App 4 Dist. 1984).
Attorney filed partially successful suit against former clients based on their intervention in his work.
Riley v. State, 676 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.App. 5 Dist. 1984).
Attorney did not follow the rules closely enough in filing a motion for leave to withdraw and was therefore denied it.
Villarreal v. Cooper, 673 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.App. 4 Dist. 1984).
Malpractice ruling reversed on basis of lack of causation.
Henrich v. State, 666 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.App. 5 Dist. 1983).
"Evidence obtained in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility was inadmissible."
Fuentes v. State, 664 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984).
Defamatory banter between attorneys was "manifestly improper, harmful, and prejudicial, and thus constituted reversible error."
Robinson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 279 (Tex.App. 13 Dist 1983).
Counsel is responsible for ensuring that client knows his or her appellate rights. Counsel demonstrated lack of diligence by presenting insufficient materials for review.
Ex Parte Raborn, 658 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983).
Although attorney’s professional misconduct had "no bearing in consideration of habeas petitions," court vacated case on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.
V. ATTORNEY’S FEES
Kershner v. State Bar of Texas, 879 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994).
"Attorney’s due process rights are not violated by grievance committee's failure to conduct investigatory hearing without sufficient request for hearing;" $2,500 fee was excessive.
Miller v. Armogida, 877 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994).
Attorney’s fees awarded in malpractice suit.
State Bar of Texas v. Tinning, 875 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1994).
"Disciplinary rule prohibiting sharing of legal fees with nonlawyer is not unconstitutionally vague on its face."
Rhodes v. Batilla, 848 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993).
$125,000 was not an excessive award to client for negligent acts of his attorney.
Cushnie v. State Bar of Texas, 845 S.W.2d 358 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992).
Public reprimand granted for excessive attorney’s fee.
Susman Godfrey, L.L.P. v. Marshall, 832 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992).
Appeallate court supported monetary sanctions on law firm.
Lee v. Chery, 812 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991).
Since he referred a case to a fellow attorney while he still held his license, former attorney was entitled to referral fee.
Worley v. Butler, 809 S.W.2d 242 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1990).
Court ruled that attorney was entitled to attorney’s fees and to recover costs incurred in malpractice suit filed against him.
Robinson v. Garcia, 804 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1991).
"Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether third amended contract for attorney fees ... was fraudulent precluding partial summary judgment in favor of clients."
Estate of Degley v. Vega, 797 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1990).
Claims against attorney barred by statute of limitations; "evidence was sufficient to support court's finding that attorney fee was fair."
Bray v. Jordan, 796 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1990).
"Jury's finding that attorney was not guilty of malpractice was not against great weight and preponderance of evidence .... Award to attorney of unpaid fees was supported by the evidence."
Bayoud v. Shank, Irwin & Conant, 774 S.W.2d 22 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989).
Law firm awarded over $120,000 in unpaid attorney fees.
State Bar of Texas v. Evans, 774 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1989).
Statement made by attorney’s secretary that attorney frequently billed clients for more hours than he worked "was admissible as rebuttal of her character testimony."
Lemond v. Jamail, 763 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988).
Court ruled that attorney could not collect a fee about which his client was unaware.
CLS Associates, Ltd. v. A------ B------, 762 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1988).
Clients' malpractice claim "barred by res judicata arising from a prior suit to collect attorney’s fees."
Tesoro Petroleum c. Coastal Refining, 754 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988).
A 10% attorney’s fee "did not violate public policy or Code of Professional Responsibility."
Inn of Hills, Ltd. v. Schulgen & Kaiser, 723 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1987).
"In a suit for declaratory judgment, the court 'may award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.'"
Nguyen Ngoc Giao v. Smith & Lamm, P.C., 714 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986).
Summary judgment requiring a client to pay his law firm was overturned because of unreasonable fees.
Gibson v. Marsh, 710 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1986).
Compensation of $50 to $150 per day for attorneys’ handling of indigent criminal defendants is not low enough to violate the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude.
Griffith v. Geffen & Jacobsen, P.C., 693 S.W.2d 724 (Tex.App. 5 Dist. 1985).
Interest rate charged by a law firm on over-due legal fees was not usurious, and "no duress was shown to preclude enforcement of fee agreement."
Daves v. State Bar of Texas, 691 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.App. 7 Dist 1985).
Overly-harsh penalty on violation of advertising rule reversed and cause remanded. Ad in question listed prices for uncontested divorce with and without children and property.
